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Does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Implicitly Guarantee a Right to Habeas Corpus?
by Brian Farrell*

T

Introduction

he right to a judicial determination of the lawfulness
of a person’s detention, commonly known as the right
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to habeas corpus, provides an essential safeguard against
unlawful deprivation of personal liberty. From its origins in
medieval England, habeas corpus spread to diverse corners of
the globe as part of English common law and its influence on
other legal systems. Functioning as a check on a government’s
ability to imprison an individual, habeas corpus has earned an
almost mythical status as a bulwark of liberty, and serves as a
cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The availability and scope of habeas corpus has assumed
a renewed importance in the post-September 11th world. The
right has been invoked in response to aggressive state detention
practices employed against suspected terrorists and others. In
particular, the extent of the right to habeas corpus has been a
central issue in the controversy surrounding the United States’
detention of “enemy combatants” at the Guantánamo Bay naval
facility in Cuba. Thus far, habeas corpus has provided the only
meaningful legal mechanism challenging the legal basis for
holding these detainees.
The reach of habeas corpus, however, is sometimes limited
under domestic law. The U.S. Congress’s 2006 attempt to strip
courts’ jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo detainees’ habeas corpus petitions without providing a suitable substitute underscores
the importance of habeas corpus guarantees in international
human rights instruments.1 The sixtieth anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides a fitting opportunity to explore the extent to which that instrument
guarantees the right to habeas corpus.

President and Chair of the Commission on Human Rights,
Eleanor Roosevelt looking at the UDHR.

Having given priority to drafting the non-binding declaration, which could be adopted by resolution of the General
Assembly, the Commission’s drafting committee began considering which rights were suitable for inclusion. Initially, the
committee elected to include the right to habeas corpus in an
article guaranteeing liberty of the person. Closely modeled on
the habeas corpus language in the American Law Institute’s
1945 Statement of Essential Human Rights, the committee’s
provision stated that “[e]very one placed under arrest or detention shall have the right to immediate judicial determination of
the legality of any detention to which he may be subject.” 3
As the drafting process continued, however, members of the
committee suggested incorporating additional rights into the
draft declaration. As part of this process, the rights to a speedy
trial and to release on bail were tacked on to the end of the
habeas corpus provision.4 The article that emerged contained
three distinct categories of rights: the right to liberty of person,
the right to habeas corpus, and fair trial rights applicable to
criminal proceedings.
By the time the committee unveiled this wide-ranging article,
however, a shift had occurred in the Commission regarding the
draft declaration’s appropriate content. The expanded habeas

Drafting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
In early 1947, less than a year after the first session of the
United Nations General Assembly, the newly-created Human
Rights Commission (the Commission) met for the first time to
begin work on an “International Bill of Human Rights,” which
would include both a non-binding declaration of human rights
and a binding convention. To aid in its work, the Commission
requested that the UN Secretariat create an outline of rights for
it to consider as it began its task. The right to habeas corpus
was one of the forty-eight items included in the Secretariat’s
outline.2
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corpus article conflicted with an emerging preference among
many members of the Commission to produce a shorter declaration less concerned with specifics. In the words of one representative, “the Declaration should lay down principles and not
become involved with details.”5 In June 1948, the Commission
voted to approve a revised draft of the entire UDHR that contained less detailed articles. The article that contained the right to
habeas corpus was rewritten to reflect the general principle that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” 6
This streamlined version of the draft declaration was forwarded via the Economic and Social Council to the Third
Committee of the General Assembly. There, the lack of a habeas
corpus provision did not go unnoticed, and the omission caused
concern in the minds of many delegates. While the reinstatement
of the specific right was rejected as being incompatible with a
view of the UDHR as a brief statement of general principles, the
absence of any remedial provisions was equally unacceptable.
Eventually, the Third Committee voted to add a broad
remedial provision proposed by Mexico and based on the
Latin American concept of amparo. This new language, added
as Article 8, guaranteed that “[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or law.”7 This provision was forwarded to the full General
Assembly for inclusion in the UDHR, approved 10 December
1948.

did not exist as a separate remedy, its function was incorporated
into general or specific versions of amparo.
In its final version, Article 8 of the UDHR includes a broadly
stated remedy, equivalent to the general remedy of amparo.
Given the absence of a separate habeas corpus provision, the
general remedy of amparo can be understood to include the
right to a determination of the legality of a person’s detention,
so long as national law contains a prohibition against arbitrary
and unlawful detention.

Does Article 8 Provide an Adequate Remedy for
Unlawful Detention?
While the Article 8 amparo provision in the UDHR allows
for a general judicial remedy for violations of national constitutions or laws, does this truly fill the void left by removing a specific habeas corpus provision? Habeas corpus has evolved into
a highly specialized and distinct right with particular connota-

Although the final version
of the UDHR did not
contain an explicit reference
to habeas corpus, one
reading of the document is
that the addition of amparo
in Article 8 in effect
implicitly restored the right.

The Relationship Between Amparo and
Habeas Corpus
Although the final version of the UDHR did not contain an
explicit reference to habeas corpus, one reading of the document
is that the addition of amparo in Article 8 in effect implicitly
restored the right. The remedies of amparo and habeas corpus
are closely related. While habeas corpus developed in English
law exclusively as a means of challenging an unlawful detention, amparo developed more recently across Latin America as
a broad mechanism available to remedy the violation of any fundamental rights, including those of personal liberty. Influenced
by the Spanish remedy of manifestación de las personas, the
United States concept of judicial review, and Anglo-American
habeas corpus, amparo originated in nineteenth-century Mexico
and spread in various forms across Central and South America.
As amparo spread, national judicial systems throughout
Latin America adopted procedures for determining the legality
of a person’s detention under models that incorporated elements
of both habeas corpus and amparo. In Mexico, and later in
Chile, a remedy known as amparo de la libertad evolved as one
of several specific versions of the writ of amparo. In Venezuela,
Honduras, and Nicaragua, no such specialized version existed,
and challenges to detention occurred under the general remedy
of amparo. On the other hand, the writ of habeas corpus was
adopted as the exclusive means of determining the lawfulness
of detention in Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa
Rica, Panama, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, while the general
remedy of amparo remained available to vindicate all other
constitutional rights.8
In essence, habeas corpus and amparo coexisted in many of
these countries, with habeas corpus used as the specific remedy
for unlawful detention and amparo available for all other violations of fundamental rights. In countries where habeas corpus

tions. The Commission was aware of this, as habeas corpus was
the only remedy of a specific nature included in the Secretariat’s
outline of possible rights for inclusion in the UDHR. Its removal
was a conscious decision by the Commission, as was the Third
Committee’s decision not to restore a specific habeas corpus
article.
These factors might suggest that Article 8 was not intended
to include the right to habeas corpus. In addition, Article 8
only provides a remedy for violations of national law. The
Commission’s draft habeas corpus provision, on the other hand,
might have been interpreted to require that a remedy be made
available for violations of personal liberty as defined by the
UDHR itself, and not only those that violated national law. In
this way, the article would have provided wider protection in
3

The U.S. Congress’s 2006 attempt to strip courts’
jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo detainees’ habeas
corpus petitions without providing a suitable substitute
underscores the importance of habeas corpus guarantees
in international human rights instruments.
specific rights, but as a statement of general principles. The
subsequent removal of the specific right to habeas corpus must
be viewed through the same lens. The removal of the right was
therefore not a rejection of the concept of habeas corpus, but part
of conscious decision by the drafters to make the UDHR a less
detailed and more idealized affirmation of human rights.
Even in this environment, however, the omission of habeas
corpus did not go unnoticed, and was the impetus for the addition of the broader amparo provision in the Third Committee. It
is significant that the addition of this provision was spearheaded
by representatives from Latin American countries who would
have understood the concept of amparo to implicitly include
the right to habeas corpus in the absence of a separate, specific
statement of that right. Certainly, the text of Article 8 is broad
enough to guarantee a remedy for violation of the right to liberty. In this context, Article 8 should be read as encompassing
the right to habeas corpus.

situations where national law permitted detention that might be
considered unlawful or arbitrary by international standards.
At the same time, the Commission’s draft habeas corpus
provision lacked any reference to one of the basic elements of
habeas corpus in the Anglo-American tradition: the authority of
the court to order a person’s release if detention is determined

Habeas Corpus in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
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During the Commission’s early sessions, it was decided that
its goal of creating an “International Bill of Human Rights”
would be best achieved by drafting both a non-binding declaration and a binding convention to be ratified by UN memberstates. One result of this decision was the emergence of the view
among delegates that the UDHR should reflect broad principles
while the convention should provide a detailed list of specific
rights. As described above, the removal of an explicit right to
habeas corpus from the UDHR was primarily a result of this
view. Examining the treatment of the right to habeas corpus
in the corresponding binding convention, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), provides additional context for assessing the extent to which Article 8 of the
UDHR may implicitly guarantee the right.
From the start, the right to habeas corpus was included
among the enumerated provisions of the ICCPR. The earliest
drafts actually contained language guaranteeing a “remedy in
the nature of ‘habeas corpus.’”9 This language was amended,
however, to provide a more universal description of the right. By
1952, the habeas corpus article was essentially in its final form.
The ICCPR’s adoption and ratification would, of course, take
many more years. The General Assembly adopted the covenant

Drafting Committee Meeting in Lake Success, New York, 1947.

to be unlawful. As written, the Commission’s draft only provided for “judicial determination of the legality” of detention.
By omitting this key element, the draft article would have either
provided an ineffectual remedy, or it would have had to be read
only as a general requirement to make habeas corpus available
as opposed to a detailed procedural rule.
The latter reading, of course, is consistent with the drafters’ decision to frame the UDHR not as an enumerated list of
4

Conclusion

in 1966 and it took effect in 1976 upon ratification by the thirtyfifth state-party. ICCPR Article 9(4) contained an unambiguous
guarantee to habeas corpus, stating:

Analyzing the drafting history of the UDHR and the background of the amparo provision, it is evident that Article 8
should be read to guarantee the availability of habeas corpus as a
remedy against the violation of the fundamental right to personal
liberty. The enumeration of a specific habeas corpus right in the
ICCPR affirms the view that the UDHR implicitly guaranteed
the right while also providing an express statement of the right
in a binding instrument.
The right to habeas corpus has assumed an enhanced
importance in recent years due to practices employed in the
fight against terrorism. Its existence in the UDHR and other
international human rights instruments is significant given both
the UDHR’s moral and political weight and the influence these
instruments have in developing national law.
HRB

Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before
a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.10
Including a specific habeas corpus article in the ICCPR
lends weight to the argument that UDHR Article 8 encompasses
a right to habeas corpus. Moreover, it vindicates removing the
habeas corpus provision from the UDHR by highlighting the
provision’s shortcomings. Unlike the draft provision considered
for the UDHR, Article 9(4) of the ICCPR specifically mandates
that courts be empowered to order the release of a person it finds
to be unlawfully detained.
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